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VVITH the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dol-
lar continuing to increase rapidly, the search goes on
for explanations of this unprecedented rise. Explana-
tions ofexchange rate movements frequently focus on
two factors: (1) changes in credit market conditions
reflected by changes in interest i-ate differentials
across countnes and (2) changes in the monetary pol-
icy stances of central banks, especially those of the
Federal Reserve.
In this article, the validity of these explanations is
tested. Specifically, we investigate the impact of a
change in U.S. short-term interest rates relative to
those in Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the
United Kingdom on the bilateral foreign exchange
rates between the U.S. dollar and each country’s
currency.
Since there has been a particular focus recently on
the impact ofunexpected changes in monetary policy
upon exchange rates, we investigate this also.’
Changes in the discount rate charged by the Federal
Reserve on short-term loans to depository institutions
are frequently considered to be an important indica-
tor of the Fed’s intentions. Moreover, discount rate
changes havebeen shown to have a significant impact
on the dollar’s exchange value if these changes are
unanticipated.’ Consequently, these changes are in-
cluded to proxy changes in policy by the Federal Re-
serve. In addition, the analysis is conducted for both
before and after October 1979 to investigate the effect
ofthe Federal Reserve’s decision to place more empha-
sis on the growth of reserves and less on the federal
funds rate in the conduct ofmonetary policy.
EXCHANGE HATES: AN ASSET
%IABKET VIEW
The exchange rate is simply the price of one coun-
try’s currency in terms of another’s. It is determined in
organized, efficient markets in the same manner as are
the prices of other assets, such as stocks, bonds orreal
estate. Because these assets are durable, their current
prices reflect people’s perceptions of current events
and expectations of futuie events as well. In other
words, the current price of the asset reflects its ex-
pected future price. Consequently, any information
that leads individuals to alter their expectations about
the future price of an asset has an effect on the asset’s
current price.
Dallas S. Battenis aresearch officerandDaniel L. Thornton is a senior
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Paul 0. Chris-
topherprovidedresearch assistance.
‘See Cornell (1982,1983), Engel and Frankel (1984) and Urich and
Wachtel (1981).
‘SeeBatten and Thornton (1984). The discount rate analysis here is
an extension of the Batten-Thornton model. The distinction here is
that the use of bilateral exchange rates enables the inclusion of
interestrate differentials overthe entiresample period.
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The assets involved in the determination of ex-
change mates are domestic money supplies. Thus, the
fundamental determinants of exchange rate move-
ments must include, among other things, the factors
that affect the demand for and the supply of domestic
monies. Obviously then, the monetary policy objec-
tives of central banks, the market’s perception of the
future course ofpolicy actions, and credit market con-
ditions across countries play integral roles in deter-
mining exchange rates.
I.NTEREST HA’I’E IMFTI3REN’TIALS
A.NI) EXCHANGE HATE NH:WENIEVI’S
The relationship between nominal interest rate dif-
ferentials and exchange rate movements is complex
and ambiguous. The decision to reallocate portfolios
and the associated capital flowsdoes not depend sim-
ply on the nominal interest differential, but on this
differential adjusted for’ the expected rate of apprecia-
tion or depreciation of the foreign exchange value of
the dollar! In actuality, an incipient capital flow and
the subsequent change in theexchange rate will occur
only ifthe higher nominal interest rate in one country
is not offset byan expectation of an equal-sized depre-
ciation ofthat country’s currency.’
The expectation of future appreciation or deprecia-
tion of a currency is linked closely to the expectation
of future inflation in one country vis-a-vis that in an-
other. If the rate of inflation in the United States is
expected to exceed that in Germany by 5 percent,
then, other things equal, the U.S. dollar would be ex-
pected to depreciate against the Deutsche mark 1DM)
by 5 percent.’ Since nominal interest rates contain
both a real return and a premium for expected in-
flation, this expected inflation rate differential also
would bereflected by nominal interest rates in thetwo
countries. That is, if inflation is expected to be 5 per-
centage points higher in the United States than in
Germany, U.S. nominal interest rates would be 5 per-
centage points higher than those in Germany, other
things equal. Consequently, a nominal interest differ-
‘See Mudd (197gb), Batten (1981), Wilby (1981) and Bergstrand
(1983).
4ln fact, if a rising (falling) interest differential is more than offset by
increased expectations of exchange rate depreciation (apprecia-
tion), the spot exchange rate can actually depreciate (appreciate)
even with a rising (falling) interest differential. See Mudd (1979b)
and Batten (1981).
‘For a discussion of this concept, called relative purchasing power
parity, see Batten andOtt (1983).
entialin favor of theUnited States would be associated
with a depreciating dollar if this interest differential
was caused by an expected higher rate of inflation in
the United States relative to Germany.
In this regard, achanging nominal interest differen-
tial can reflect a change in either the real interest
differential or the inflation differential. If it reflects a
change in the inflation differential, the nominal differ-
ential and the exchange rate will move in opposite
directions as above. If it reflects a change in the real
differential, just the opposite occurs. In particular,
when certain events (such as changes in tax laws, asset
preferences or the relative price of energy) have differ-
ent impacts on nominal interest rates and inflation
rates — both actual and expected — the real interest
differential will change as well, and the exchange rate
will change in the same direction.
IJISCQUNU~ HIVFE (I~HA SUES ANI)
EXCHA.NGE HATE )~IOVLU.4ENTS
Ifachange in thediscount rate,when announced, is
to have a perceptible effect on the current exchange
rate, it must (1) transmit (or be believed to transmit)
some information about the policy intentions of the
Federal Reserve and (2) be unanticipated? Ifthe mar-
ket expects a discount rate change, this expectation
will be reflected by the exchange rate immediately. If
the discount rate change represents an unexpected
change in current orfuture monetary policy, it will be
assithilated by the foreign exchange rate concomitant
with the announcement of the discount rate change!
An unanticipated discount rate change may lead
individuals to alter their expectations of the future
course of monetary policy; however, there are several
theories about the impact of such changes on the
exchange rate? The nature of the effect depends criti-
‘Thisdiscussionignoresthepossibilityofan indirect ‘liquidity effect,”
whereby an increase on the discountrate increasesdomestic inter-
est ratesand, hence,a decline in the foreign exchangevalueof the
dollar. This is a possibility since Thornton (1982) has shown a
temporary effect of discount rate changes on domestic interest
rates.
‘The incorporation of discount rate changesinto the analysisin this
manner creates an identification problem. It is impossible to deter-
mine whether it is the actualdiscount ratechange orthe announce-
ment of new information thataffects theforeign exchange value of
the dollar.
‘These have been offered as possible explanations of the potential
impact of unanticipated money supply announcement on the ex-
change rate. SeeCornell (1983).
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cally on how the announcement reshapes expecta-
tions. For example, an unexpected increase in the
discount i-ate may be interpreted as a tightening of
current monetary policy and, consequently, may gen-
erate expectations that the Fed will counteract this
move with a relatively looser policy in the future.’ In
this case, the market would bid down current real
interest rates, expecting them to be realized subse-
quently. Consequently, the foreign exchange value of
the dollar would depreciate as nominal interest rates
fall in the short run, reflecting the lower ex ante real
rates.
On the other hand, this same increase may simply
motivate widespread anticipation ofcontinued mone-
tary tightening. In this instance, individuals might ex-
pect alower rate of U.S. inflation relative to that in the
rest of the world. This will gener-ate expectations of
future appreciation of the U.S. dollar, which will be
discounted into an appreciation of the current ex-
change i-ate, accompanied by lower- nominal interest
rates as inflation expectations fall.
This inflationary-expectations effect may not be dis-
tinguishable from an initial liquidity effect. In other
words, the rise in the discount rate may cause an
initial rise in U.S. real interest rates and, hence, an
initial widening of the interest rate differential. Conse-
quently, an increase in the discount rate may cause
the foreign exchange value ofthe dollar torise through
either liquidity or inflationary-expectations effects.
SINiPI F oons:~.i,gOP LFCH.AN(E~
1I,ATE M(Yt.T;M :VrS
To examine the possible announcement effect of a
discount rate change and the possible impact of
changes in the nominal interest differential, we spe’1-
115 a simple model of daily exchange rate movements.
In addition to these variables, the model should in-
clude numerous variables that are commonly consid-
ered to influence the dollar price of foreign currencies,
such as U.S. and foreign money stocks, real incomes,
expected long-term inflation rates and cuirent ac-
count balances.” Unfortunately, observations on these
variables are not available on adaily basis. As an alter-
native, we simply employ a distributed lag of past
exchange rate changes.
‘This so-called “policy anticipation effect” is attributed to Urich and
Wachtel (1981).
“See, for example, Meese and Rogoff (1983).
Furthermore, only unanticipated discount rate
changes should be impor-tant in an empirical model.
Since the usual procedure for estimating these unex-
pected changes (through modeling expected discount
rate changes) is inappropriate because of the disci-ete
nature ofthese changes, actual discount rate changes
are employed here. We do, however, attempt to lessen
the potential bias associated with using the actual
discount rate changes by (1) introducing a distributed
lag ofthe change in the difference between the federal
funds rate and the discount rate as aproxy measure of
the market’s anticipation of future discount rate
changes and (2) employing the reasons for the change
given by the Fed when the change is announced to
partition the set of discount rate changes.
There is an intuitive rationale for using the distrib-
uted lagofchanges in the federal funds rate/discount
rate spread to measure anticipated changes in the
discount i-ate. During approximately half ofthe period
that we analyzed, the Fed attempted to maintain a
relatively narrow spread between these rates. Thus, an
atypical and prolonged widening or narrowing ofthis
spread could have signaled that a discount rate
change was imminent. Given the asset appr-oach to
exchange rate determination, such anticipated dis-
count rate changes would then be reflected by a
change in the exchange rate prior to the actual an-
nouncement of the change in the discount rate. In-
cluding a distributed lag of the federal funds rate/
discount rate spread should help account fom such
effects.
Furthermore, when the Fed announces a discount
rate change, it states the reason for thechange. Conse-
quently, discount rate changes can be partitioned into
two gr’oups according to the reason accompanying
them: technical or policy-related.
Discount rate changes made solely to bring the dis-
count rate into closer alignment with short-term mar-
ket rates are merely technical adjustments and do not
reflect changes in monetary policy. Using this infor-
mation to partition the actual discount rate changes
should lessen the potential downward bias for two
reasons: First, discount rate changes made purely for
technical reasons are less likely to be interpreted as
indicating a change in Federal Reserve policy. Hence,
it is less likely that there is an announcement effect
associated with them. Second, they are more likely to
be anticipated, so that any policy-related information
they might contain is likelyto be incorporated into the
current exchange rate before the change in the dis-
count rate. Finally, during the period analyzed, the
policy-related reasons included both domestic andFEDERAL REBERVE BANK OF BY, LOt/lB FEBRUARY 1985
international objectives. Consequently, the policy-mo-
tivated discount rate changes were partitioned
accordingly.
Additional Hypotheses
Besides the hypotheses already presented, several
others of interest can be tested within this framework.
First, Mudd (1979a)has proposed that the November 1,
1978 discount rate change should have had asubstan-
tially larger impact on the foreign exchange value of
the dollar than others did (even those made for policy
reasons) because it was accompanied by severalother
Fed actions that were intended to strengthen the dol-
lar.”The most important ofthese was the stated intent
ofthe Fed and Treasury to intervene more actively in
foreignexchange markets, which was accompanied by
an arrangement through which the United States
floated foreign-currency-denominated debt to obtain
funds to finance this intervention. To investigate this
proposition, we partitioned thedata by separating the
discount rate change on November 1, 1978, from the
others made for international reasons.
Furthermore, we investigate the possible impact of
U.S. intervention in foreign exchange markets by sepa-
rating discount rate changes made for international
reasons during periods when the United States ac-
tively intervened from those made during the rest of
the sample period. The United States has typically
intervened infrequently in foreign exchange markets,
leaving that activity primarily to foreign monetary au-
thorities. With strong downward pressure on the dol-
lar during 1978, however, the Fed and the U.S. Trea-
sury adopted a more activist intervention policy: from
November 1978 to March 1981, they intervened fre-
quently and in large amounts. This dramatic change
in policy n-tight have altered the impact of unantici-
pated discount rate changes on the foreign exchange
value of the dollar.
Finally, we partitioned the discount rate changes
made for domestic reasons atOctober 6, 1979, the date
the Fed changed its operating procedure for imple-
menting domestic monetary policy. On that date, the
Fed announced that it was placing greater emphasis
on bank reserves and less emphasis on the federal
funds rate in conducting day-to-day open market op-
erations.” After this change, the spread between the
federal funds and the discount rates became larger
and more variable than itwas before. Consequently, all
“See Mudd (1979a) fordetails.
“See Lang (1980).
discount rate changes, including those made for pol-
icy reasons, maybe lesspredictable (and, hence, more
likely to have an impact on the exchange rate) under
the reserves targeting procedure than they were un-
der the federal funds rate targeting procedure.
EMPIHIGAC RESULTS
To test the hypotheses outlined above, variants of
the following equation were estimated using daily
data forthe period January 2,1975, to October 31, 1984:
77
Ii) ahi 5, = a +~ft Mn S,. + ~ y4 (FFB-DR),,
where
1=1 1=1
+ è AUR, + ‘,~ARDIFF, + e,,
S = the U.S. dollarprice of a unit offoreign currency
on day t,
FEB = the U.S. federal funds rate,
DR = the U.S. discount rate, and
RDIFF = the difference between the U.S. 90-day CD rate
and a comparable foreign short-term interest
rate.
The currencies included are those of Canada, France,
Germany, Japan and the United Klngdom.’~There
were 37 changes in the discount rate during this pe-
riod. Of these, 16 were made solely for technical rea-
sons, 14 included domestic (but not international)
monetary policy considerations and seven included
international policy considerations.”
The results are reported in tables 1—5. Because the
estimated coefficients of ADR (and its partitions) and
ARDIFF are the focus of this analysis, only these esti-
mates are presented. Of particular interest are the
relatively low adjusted B’s across the estimation forall
countries. These support the basic conclusion ofthe
asset market approach to exchange rate determina-
tion, that is, that most ofthe variance ofexchange rate
movements is attributable to unexpected events.
Nonetheless, as the F-statistics demonstrate, all ofthe
estimations are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
“The lag length chosen for each distributed lag was the longest
period possible without overlapping discount rate changes. Also, a
distributed lag of ARDIFF was included initially, but did not add to
the explanatorypower of theestimated equation for any currency.
“Thesecountries make up the over 68 percent ofthetrade-weighted
exchange rate.
“See Batten and Thornton for a moredetailed discussion,apresen-
tation of discount rate changes during this period and the reasons
given for these changes.
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Table 1
Estimation of Equation 1
Estimated Parameters
Country ADA ARDIFF R2 SE F
Canada -000105 00008r 00146 3.37’
jl 92) (4.40) 00023
France 0 00648’ --0.00561 - 00687 12.83*
(465) 11.41) 00057
Germany --0 00730’ --000717 00975 18.32’
(5.43) (14 161 0 0055
Japan 000100 0.00614’ 00518 9.75’
(072) (1092) 00057
United 0 00363’ 0 00279’ 00265
Kingdom i2 69) (6 96) 00055 5 36’
Absolute values oft-statistics in parentheses ‘Statistically significant atthe 5 percent level.
For each of the currencies except that of Japan,
there is a statistically significant (at the 6 perent level
for Canada) announcement effect associated with dis-
count rate changes (table 1). Furthermore, when the
U.S. discount rate is increased (decreased), the U.S.
dollar appreciates (depreciates) against each ofthese
currencies, a result that tends to support the in-
flationary expectations hypothesis.” A I percentage-
point change in the discount rate (for whatever rea-
son) motivates an exchange rate change that ranges
from a low of 0.11 percentage points in Canada to a
high of 0.73 percentage points in Germany, all other
things constant. This result is economically, as well as
statistically, significant as the average absolute daily
exchange rate change during this period ranged from
0.16 percent in Canada to 0.40 percent in Germany.
Changes in the interest differential exhibited asta-
tistically significant impact on daily exchange rate
movements for everycountry in thesample. Moreover,
in each case, an increase (decrease) in the interest
differential generated an appreciation (depreciation)
of the dollarexchange rate.
The magnitude of the impact, however, differed
substantially across countries. For example, the U.S.
“Since S is the U.S. dollar price of a unit of foreign currency, a
negative sign for an estimated parameter in equation 1 indicates
that anincrease in that right-hand-sidevariable causes S to decline,
or, alternatively, the foreign currency price of a U.S. dollar (itS) to
rise. So, e.g., the negative coefficient on ADR indicates that an
increase (decrease) in the U.S. discount rate causes the foreign
exchange value of the dollarto appreciate (depreciate).
dollar/Deutsche mark exchange rate was the most af
fected, changing by roughly 0.72 percent for each per
centage-point change in the interest differential. Al
ternatively, the U.S. dollar/ Canadian dollar exchangt
rate moved only 0.08 percent for each percentage
point change in the interest differential.
When the discount rate changes are partitioned ac
cording tothe reason given forthe change (table 2), thiE
results differ across countries. One common point
however, is that discount rate changes made for tech-
nical reasons never have an announcement effect fo~
any currency. This is to be expected because thesE
changes do not represent changes in Fed policy. Dis
count rate changes made for domestic reasons arc
statistically significant in three of the five cases: Can-
ada, France and Germany. Changes made for interna-
tional reasons are significant for each country excepi
Canada and have an impact four to 10 times larger
than those of changes made for domestic reasons. In
the case of Japan, however, the effect is due solely tc
the discount rate change on November 1, 1978, as
noted below.
It/ste ogA.dctthon.at .tttvoth.eses
The separation ofthe discount rate change made on
November 1, 1978, from the others made for interna-
tional reasons (table 3) reveals that this was indeed an
important discount rate change. Its impact was sig-
nificant for every country except Canada and four to
six times larger than the impact of other changes for
international reasons. Moreover, the November 1
£0FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OFSt LOUIS PESRUARY J9$5
Table 2
Estimation of Equation 1 with Discount Rate Changes Partitioned by Reason
Estimated Parameters
country .~ORDOM 2DRINT -. .SDRTEcH ARDIFF R~ SE F
canada 0.00173~ 0.00152 0 00003 0 00080’ 0 0147 3 12’
(2 14; (117) 1003) (435j 00023
France 000501 00248P 0.00064 000556’ 0.0832 1392’
2 46i (763) (028) (11.37) 00057
Germary 000594 0,02685’ 0.00001 00070& 01130 19 15~
3 03; (8.23) ‘0.001 (14 06~ 0.0055
Japan 000113 0 01469’ 0.00298 - 000606’ 00592 9 96~
055) 14.52 1131) (10 81) 00056
United 0.00182 0 01642’ 000033 000275’ 0.0334 592’
Kingdom (092) f5 171 (0 15~ (686) 00055
Absolute value of t-statisnc in parentheses ‘Slatisficaily significantat the 5 percent level.
ADRDOM discount ratc changes fordomestic reasons
ADRINT discountrate changes for internationa, reasons
ADRTEGH discount ratechanges fortechnical reasons
Table 3
Estimation of Partitioned Equation 1 with Emphasis on November 1, 1978
Estimated Parameters -.
Country 2DRDOM ADRNOV78 .~DROINT .SDRTECH .IRDIFF R’ SE F
Canada 0 00173’ 0 00095 - 0 00270 0.00003 000081’ 0.0150 3.05’
(2.13) (042; (1 71) (0.03) (439) 00023
France 0.00506’ 005035’ 001249’ 000065 0.00554’ 0.0935 1492?
(249) (888; (3 171 (0.29) (11.40) 00056
Germany 0 00602’ 005658’ 001095’ 0.00004 0.00708’ 01288 20 94’
(3 10~ (10 37) (289) (002) (14 23i 00054
Japan 0 001 ‘2 0 03361’ 0.00552 0.00303 0 00610’ 0.0649 10 37’
fOSSi W.951 (1.40) ~l.34~ (1091 0.0056
United 000184 003141’ 0.00915’ 000037 000275’ 00371 620’
Kingdom (093; (566) 12.37) (0.17) (689) 0.0055
Absolutevalue oft-stahstics in parentheses Statisticaciy significant at the 5 percent level.
ADRDOM d;scount rate changesfor aomestic reasons
ADRNOV78 discount ratechange on November 1 1978
.~DROINT discount rate changes forinternational reasons other thanon November 1 1978
ADRIECH discount ratechangesfor technical reasons
tilTs c-luulgc nas lilt inth cflscuuni alt’ cluing’ during ,)iu~u.~s~ ~nt I ffld!i~ - lou the three ri_’i
(lie Ifl’i’iIII l• Iht\-c’ ZIii\ Inl[IZI(l ciii iI~vtiOllai’ ‘lii C.~ hr tvhicll nivrn,rioiuil UIi.~L!1(4t’,OtheFihifil thZ’J 0(1
cIizciigc’ alt. I his icflp.tr! ~‘as cth’riiic’Iv l:cigi-. ‘with a I \c,u-mhc’r’ 1 U~S had a ~l~IistiuaiIv —‘ignilicant CifPI’t
tn-il’tI;Iagc’ lictilit ;-ll,Ingr- 1% lit’ ttis,c,’icil i-aLt- Iracii,ig ‘lhosc Ut i’l,UlIc’. G,-’iI,iM\ antI (hr ‘nfli’d I~mg’iorn -
to :i :c :n; p&’rri’nl chaiig- in (hr cloIl:cr ‘-‘n raft all this unpari. \t,N ‘ignilit-ant ohlV during tilt- )rr(o~:
olhrr !h!iIMs dUflSiaili dOiliVZtI’i’U ~~th th’ au-c-age a1~ ~uti-h iii,’! rU n,-ts ,u-liu’h’ nu~~rning iii tor’i,n r\
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Table4
Estimation of Partitioned Equation 1 with Emphasis on Intervention
Estimated Parameters
Country .~DRDOM .XDRNOV7B .XDROINV .~DRONINV .IDRTECH .SRDIFF R’-SE F
Canada 000173 000095 0.00280 000255 000003 -0.00081 - 00146 290
(213) (042) (1 38) (1.01) (0.03) (438) 00023
France 000505 005036 001621” 0.00669 0.00064 0.00554’ 0.0937 1425
(2.49) (889) (321) (1 06m (0.291 (II 40) 0.0056
Germany 0.00603’ 0 05665’ 001588 000323 0 00003 0.00707’ 0 1293 20.04
(310) (10 38; (327) 10.53) (0.01) (14 20; 00054
Japan 000112 003361’ -000478 000666 000303 0.00610’ 00646 9.85
(055) (595; ~0.95l r.06 II 341 (10 90) 00056
United 000184 -003141’ 0.01025’ 0.00742 0.00037 000275 0.0368 590
Kingdom (0.93) (5.66) (2.07) ft 20) (017) (689) 0.0055
Absolute values oft-statistics in parentheses ‘Statisticallysignificant at the 5 percent mevel.
.~DRDOM discount rate changes for domestic reasons.
.~DRINT discount rate changes forinternational reasons.
~DRTECH discount rate changes fortechnical reasons.
.iDRNOV78 discountrate change on November 1, 1978.
.~DROiNV discount rate changes for international reasons other than on November 1. 1978. during period of active intervention
.XDRONINV discount rate changestorinternational reasonsduring peniod of ‘nactive intervention.
~I~IUT(.k.tIMTr .1 070 (j~~pxwin. f5g.4~~v~g
Ifsnort’s Pubes
The possible impact of the change in Federal Re-
servepolicy procedure in October1979 is examined in
table 5. This examination was implemented by parti-
tioning ADRDOMand ARDIFF at October 6, 1979, in the
variant ofequation I where discount rate changes are
partitioned by reason.” The results for ADRTECH and
SPRINT are consistent with those in table 2. Specif-
ically, discount rate changes made for technical rea-
sons had no significant announcement effect, while
those made for international reasons did for all cur-
rencies except the Canadian dollar. Furthermore, for
the currencies forwhich discount rate changes made
for domestic reasons have significant announcement
effectsoverthe entire period (Canadian dollar, French
franc and Deutsche mark), these effects were signifi-
cant only after October 1979.
Only three ofthe 14 changes on the discount rate for
domestic policy reasons occurred during the pre-
“Since only the discount rate and interest rate differential variables
areof interest, the parameters in the othervariables were assumed
to be thesame over both periods.
October 1979 period. Nonetheless, these pre-Octob
1979 changes did not have a significant effect on ti
foreign exchange value of the dollar for any countr
While this result is based on relatively few discou
rate changes, it does suggest either that discount ra
changes were more readily anticipated or that evi
unanticipated changes contained little useful infc
mation when theFederal Reserves primary policy o
jective was to smooth or stabilize short-term intere
rates.
An interesting result emerging from this partitio
ingis that changes in the interest differential were n
statistically significant before October 6, but we
highly significant afterward. (This effect, however, w
significant at the 10 percent level in the earlier perk
for the dollar/PM rate. But even in this case, the ii
pact is four times larger after October 6, 1979, than
was before.) A possible explanation for this is that tl
period between January 1, 1975, and October 6, 197
was one in which both the rate of U.S. money grow
and the rate of U.S. inflation accelerated dramatical
relative tothose in the rest of theworld. Consequent)
changes in the US. nominal interest differential p
marily may have been reflecting changing inflationa
expectations; thus, these changes had no statistical
significant impact on theforeign exchange value of ti
dollar.
28Table 5
Estimation of Partitioned Equation 1 with iXDRDOM and SRDIFF
partitioned at October 6, 1979
Estimated Parameters for
Variable Canada France Germany Japan - U.K.
iDROOMI 0.00020 0.00393 0.00845 0.00168 -000343
(008) (0.60) (1.33) ~0.261 t0.54~
~DR0OM2 0.00189’ - 0.00447’ 0.00535’ 0.00149 0.00080
(2 221 (2.101 (260) (0.69) (0.39)
iDRtNT 0.00158 0.02647’ -0.02690’ -001620’ 0.01672’
ci 22t (8 18) ~8.561 ~ (5.30~
,~DRTECH 000001 0 00087 0 00001 0.00306 0.00065
(001) (0.39) (001) (1351 (0.30)
.~RDIFF~ 000019 0.00098 - 0.00219 000122 0.00050
(052) t091) (1.711 (0.89) (0.731
SRDIFF2 000099’ 0 00722’ 0.00792’ -0 00699’ 0 00438’
(472) (t329) (1461) (11 47) (9.00)
FR 00155 00989 01183 0.0639 0.0453
SE 00023 0.0056 0.0054 00056 0.0055
F 3.02’ 15.08’ 18.20 ~ br
Absolute varies ci t’statsstrcs in parentheses. ‘Stabsticatly significant at the 5 percent level
.~DRDOM1..SRDIFF1 .~DRDOMarid .1FRDIFF. respectively, before 106.79 and zero afterwards
.SDRDOM2 SHOIEF? .~DRDOM and .XFRDIFF. respectively. after 10679 ano zero before
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they are not neutralized by offsetting changes in ex-
pected exchange rate movements. It appears that this
was the case only during the period when the Federal
Reserve followed a decidedly disinflationary policy.
The reader is cautioned, however, that the majority
of dail exchange rate movements are explained by
events other than previous exchange rate movements,
discount rate changes and interest differential
changes. The simple model estimated here never ex-
plained more than 15 percent of the variance of daily
changes in these five exchange rates.
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